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Revolutions: An Insight into a Five 
Centuries' Trend * 
Leonid Grinin 
Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Moscow, the National Research University 
Higher School of Economics 
ABSTRACT 
The year 2017 marked not only the hundredth anniversary of the Revolu-
tion of 1917, but also the 500th anniversary of the beginning of the Refor-
mation in Germany. It was just the Reformation that gave start to modern 
revolutions in Europe and the world. In the first part of the article we 
analyze the course of transformation of revolutions within historical pro-
cess, in particular, how their world-historical role, the social bases, revolu-
tionary ideologies, practices, and information technologies they applied 
have changed over the centuries. Then we show the important changes that 
occurred in revolutionary practice and the very understanding of the es-
sence of revolution due to great revolutions. In the second part of the article 
we highlight some issues related to the theory of revolution, in particular, 
he defines the types of revolutions starting from religious to modernizing 
revolutions, and also points some important conditions for the revolu- 
tionary outbreak. In conclusion, we consider how and why the revolutions 
have been increasingly used as a geopolitical weapon. 
The year 2017 marked not only the hundredth anniversary of the Revolu-
tion of 1917, but also the 500th anniversary of the beginning of the Refor-
mation in Germany.1 We think that it was just the Reformation that pro-
duced the onset of modern revolutions in Europe and the world.2 This ex-
plains the title of the article. In its first part we analyze the transformation 
vectors of revolutions within historical process, in particular, how the 
social bases, revolutionary ideologies, practices, and applied information 
technologies have changed over the centuries. While considering these 
aspects we also consider various points related to the theory of revolution. 
In the second part we deal with some additional aspects of the theory of 
revolution. In conclusion, we focus on how and why revolutions have 
been increasingly used as a geopolitical weapon. 
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In the present paper there is no opportunity to survey numerous scien-
tific approaches to the definition of revolution. We should note that there is 
no generally accepted definition and it will hardly ever appear (see Grinin, 
Issaev, and Korotayev 2016; Grinin and Korotayev 2016). If we regard 
revolutions as a violent change of regime, we can say that they accompa-
nied political history for many millennia. But such revolutions are mostly 
characteristic for the polis-type states with regimes oscillating from oligar-
chic (or tyrannical) toward democratic and then back. Thus, prior to the 
early modern period the revolutions mostly occurred in the states with poli- 
tical regime less common for the pre-industrial period. From revolutionary 
perspective the history of some Hellenistic states and Rome may be also 
presented as a struggle between social and political groups for the distribu-
tion of resources and power (see, e.g., Sorokin 1992, 1994; Nefedov 2007). 
We find something of political and social revolutions (or revolution at-
tempts) in the medieval states (in Italy and some other countries). Social 
struggle was also observed in the history of some Eastern states but here the 
attempts to establish a new regime and, figuratively speaking, change 
‘a constitution’, were quite infrequent. However, sometimes ther would 
outbreak a kind of social revolution when socio-economic (distributive) 
relations were transformed.3 There also took place devastating uprisings 
which would sweep away dynasties, as it happened in China.4 
However, with all the abovementioned examples, in ancient times 
and medieval period there were no revolutions that сould enable societies' 
advance to a higher stage of social evolution. No doubt, revolutions 
played a role, but obviously less significant, in development in compari-
son with wars and other transformations. After revolutions the societies' 
production basis would not change so their progressive effect was much 
weaker than in the Modern era.  
Only starting from the modern period the revolutions became one of 
the leading driving forces of historical process (see Grinin 1997; Se-
myonov, Gobozov, and Grinin 2007; Travia and Morgania 2004; Gold-
stone 1991). Why did it happen? The reason is the transition to a new – 
industrial – production principle which started in the late fifteenth century 
(yet, its precursors became evident much earlier; for more details see: 
Grinin 2006; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015; Grinin, Korotayev 2015). 
Along with changing production pattern it was necessary to transform all 
other relations, so that a society could give abundant scope for the deve- 
lopment of new productive forces. It was the revolutions that provided the 
break of the relations that hampered development. Thus, in the present 
article we mostly deal with new-type revolutions which were practically 
unknown in the history prior to the sixteenth century. We describe them 
as an extremely important phenomenon in terms of unfolding historical 
process and as a means to carry out the society's progressive development 
to increase its economic, cultural, political, and legal level.5 In other 
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words, here we consider revolutions not just as a means of changing poli- 
tical regime, but also as a means of conflict resolution in the leading soci-
eties which already were the mainstream of technological, cultural and 
political development.6 
Finally, we should note that the increasingly large role of revolutions 
in historical process was associated not only with the general technologi-
cal transformations clearly manifested starting from the last third of the 
fifteenth century, but also with the concurrent breakthrough in infor-
mation technologies. It is essential that any great revolution or a new 
wave of revolutions is somehow connected with emerging and essentially 
new or with improved media. In what follows, we try to trace this trajec-
tory of revolutionary practices (in order to summarize it in the second part 
of the article). 
Section 1. EVOLUTION OF THE REVOLUTION 
1.1. Early revolutions (the 16th–18th centuries) 
On some preconditions for the revolutionary outbreak. There are a num-
ber of preconditions for the outbreak, development and success of a revo-
lution. We can hardly analyze all of them in the present article, all the 
more so since this is a rather controversial issue.7 Here we will focus on 
four conditions which are hardly debated but are closely interrelated. The 
first precondition is the existence of a relatively new or modified ideology 
(its distribution may take place already before the revolution or just in its 
course). In our opinion, a revolution (as distincet from a revolt or insur-
rection) needs a new or modified ideology that can do more than just 
unite people (this can be done by protest moods, exacerbated needs and 
disasters, increasing resentments from oppression and injustice). Ideology 
can give a more or less clear idea (yet, at the level of rather universal slo-
gans) that a certain political regime is better than the existing one, and to 
have a better life it is necessary to change (alternate) the latter. The se- 
cond precondition, as already mentioned, consists in the available infor-
mation technologies which appear important for many reasons since they 
serve to spread revolutionary ideology and propaganda and to attract sup-
porters. Thus, according to well-known Lenin's expression, they are both 
a collective propagandist and a collective organizer. The third important 
precondition is a high literacy rate since revolutions can hardly occur in 
societies with 2–3 per cent of literate population and demand a considera-
ble nuber of literate people. The fourth precondition is that since the 
movements' ideology involves institutional changes in political and social 
system, the revolutions could repeatedly and regularly occur only in ur-
banizing society with a certain literacy and cultural level and with intelli-
gentsia already formed as a social group; in other words, in the society 
with started and developing modernization (on the relationship between 
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revolution and modernization see Grinin 2013; 2017а; Grinin and Koro-
tayev 2016).8 
All four factors (new ideology, information technology, literacy and 
certain level of urbanization) are closely interrelated. Besides, we should 
note that revolutions may occur both in societies with majority or a large 
share of illiterate population and in a fully literate society. There are no 
any accurate criteria here. The same refers to urbanization level. But it is 
interesting to note that great revolutions may take place both in societies 
with predominant illiterate population (yet, the number of educated must 
be sufficeient enough, not less than 20–30 per cent) and in completely 
literate societies. Apparently, those revolutions turned great just because 
the revolutionary events actively engaged the most of population, i.e., 
peasantry.9 
Why may we consider the Reformation as the first revolution of 
the early modern period?10 By the start of the Reformation all the men-
tioned and other preconditions for the revolutionary outbreak in Germany 
and some other countries were evident. The germs of modernization could 
be also traced. Germany was one of the most advanced countries in Europe 
in terms of urban development, trade, and industry (especially mining). The 
European silver originated from the mines of Saxony and Bohemia (Nef 
1987: 735) while the mining was highly mechanized (for details see 
Baks 1986; Grinin 2006; Grinin L. and Grinin A. 2015, Grinin, Korotayev 
2015). Not incidentally, printing was invented in Germany as well. 
Here it makes sense to pay attention to this new and enormously 
large-scale and powerful information technology which became the most 
important material basis preparing the religious revolution. As is well-
known, the book printing appeared in the mid-fifteenth century (1445) 
and quickly spread in Europe. In the fifteenth century critical works, es-
pecially those related to church, were widely distributed in printed form, 
preparing the ground for the Reformation. Luther's theses were quickly 
printed and distributed throughout Europe. The printing technology star- 
ted the fire of the Reformation. In the sixteenth century, that is during the 
period of rising and strengthening Protestantism in Europe, there were 
printed about 500 million copies of the Bible (Nazarchuk 2006: 79)11 
along with large numbers of other books. Naturally, the increasing market 
of printed books relied on growing literacy, and, in turn, influenced its 
distribution. Again, revolutions cannot occur in fully illiterate societies. 
And at the beginning of the sixteenth century the literacy rate was rather 
high even among peasants: in 1525 during the Peasants' War in Germany 
they would print their demands. 
Thus, all crucial preconditions for revolution were evident: the in-
creasing activity of broad masses of population, the emergence of new 
ideologies, the formation of amorphous parties and sufficiently clear pro-
grams, the aspirations for radical changes in society involving its property 
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and social relations, and a sharp split in the society leading to civil wars. 
There remains the issue of changing the political regime. Actually, the 
Reformation differs from a common type of revolution in this aspect since 
the change of political regime was hardly its aim. However, the Refor-
mation to a certain extent was a political protest as well, in particular, 
against the foreign sovereign power of the Pope (e.g., in German society) 
and against the church feudal states (archbishoprics, bishoprics, etc.). Lat-
er, religious wars were anyway associated to the political system. In par-
ticular, as a result of the Augsburg religious peace of 1555 in Germany 
there was proclaimed the principle: ‘He who rules, his religion’, in other 
words the major religion in the principality was determined by the confes-
sion of a duke or a ruler. 
Religious revolutions and their transformations. Why was the reli-
gious revolution historically the primary form of revolution in Europe? To 
answer this question, we should define the difference between rebellions, 
insurrections, movements, peasant/people's wars and other forms of socio-
political struggle of the medieval period, on the one hand, and revolutions 
of the early modern period – on the other. Within the former group of mass 
struggles, the only way to overcome disasters and crisis (in terms of chan- 
ging the existing situation in political sphere with no account of social re-
quirements) was viewed in revealing the ‘truth’ to monarch, recognizing the 
insurgents' demands, substituting a ruling person (a definite monarch, cour-
tier and etc.) or, at best, a whole dynasty (as it was in China, where people 
believed that the sins of the dynasty deprive it of the Mandate of Heaven). 
However, a revolution requires institutionalized changes in political system, 
i.e., a popular representation, restricted monarchy, and a republic.12 
However, the outbreak of classical revolutionary forms with their 
clear requirements needs a long time to ripen and implies historical expe-
rience conceptuailized in ideologists' writings as well as a certain maturity 
of the society.13 These were hardly present in the sixteenth century. Con-
sequently, some intermediate forms should have emerged, thus, the reli-
gious split appeared a natural course of events. The Reformation contrib-
uted to ideological, and partly social and economic breakdown of the old 
regime and thus, it appeared an intermediate form between the old-type 
heresies and social-political revolutions of the early modern period.14 
Of course, the religious component of revolutions could hardly quickly 
disappear. First, the Reformation and religious wars lasted almost until the 
end of the sixteenth century. Secondly, the next revolution (which is almost 
widely accepted as such) – the Dutch revolt (1566–1609) – also had a clear-
ly religious nature. The Dutch Calvinists' rebel was caused by the fact that 
the Spanish government started harsh persecution against the Dutch and 
actively used a religious repressive body – the inquisition – for this pur-
pose. But, however, as it often happens in such circumstances, Spain's 
intransigence in matters of faith and other things (taxes, trade rules, the 
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level of autonomy, etc.) led to the situation that the insurgents considered 
the separation from Spain as the only way to defend the Dutch rights; 
therefore, the republic of a new type emerged. Thus, along with the reli-
gious component, the Dutch revolution clearly manifested another dimen-
sion – national which manifested in the national liberation struggle. This 
form of social resistance later became one of the most spread types of 
revolutions.15 
The further development of revolutions as recurrent phenomena was 
associated with the events in England in the first half of the seventeenth 
century. But this revolution still possesses a religious aspect. The English 
Reformation of the sixteenth century was carried out by Henry VIII from 
the top and led to the establishment of the Church of England. However, 
later the reformist movement went from the bottom, and there emerged 
Puritanism (close to Calvinism) in England. It required further changes in 
the state Church as well as in sociocultural life. The Puritans were perse-
cuted, but they played a crucial role for the defeat of King Charles I.16 
The religious factors hardly disappeared from English political life even 
after the revolution. In particular, the overthrow of James II in 1688 (the 
so-called Glorious Revolution) was caused by the King's attempts to re-
store the leading role of Catholicism in the country, whereas the majority 
of population and nobility was against it.  
Thus, it had passed long time, more than a century, until a civil revo-
lutionary ideology was developed during the Great French Revolution 
(see Grinin 2011: Lecture 8).17 
Revolutions, political regime and opportunities for the develop-
ment of society. After the emergence of the new-type republic in the 
Netherlands, the revolutions became inherently associated with changes 
in political system. Even if it was the matter of support of a contender for 
the throne (as it was in the nineteenth-century Spain), anyway the candi-
dates were expected to change political regime. This aspiration to some-
how change political system can be considered the most important attri- 
bute of revolution.  
Why should revolutions bring changes in the political system? This 
was surely connected with the rigid and hierarchical form of government 
existing then (between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries). On the one 
hand, there was simply no other way to consolidate a society when the 
states were overpassing the medieval decentralization. But on the other 
hand, any urgent transformations required changes in laws which would 
inevitably encounter the rigid political structures. Starting from the Early 
Modern period the developmental rates had evidently accelerated due to 
technological development, trade, the Great Geographical discoveries, 
increasing urbanization, literacy, distribution of information, etc. It is 
clear that changes within societies in the course of accelerated historical 
development could hardly be permanently hindered and prevented.18 
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Thus, the substantial delays in urgent and expected changes, and all the 
more the attempts to aggravate the situation by prohibitions and violations 
(as it happened in the Netherlands and England) cause an inevitable 
breakdown of the old political frame.  
After some societies obtained certain benefits from revolutions, the 
need for changes became even more acute. First, a permanent criticism of 
the regime (since the countries with a more liberal regime and higher de-
velopmental level would set an example for others, like England exempli-
fied for France in the eighteenth century, and France for Russia in the ear- 
ly twentieth century) caused a certain shift in the minds of a part of the 
elite towards a realized need for changes (even by revolutionary means); 
yet, later history proved the utter futility of their position in terms of self-
preservation (see below). Second, there also adds living under somehow 
liberalized and humanized regimes, as it occurred in France under Lou- 
is XVI and in Russia under Nicholas II. This simultaneously strengthens 
the opposition, increases its demands, reduces fear of reprisals, and gives 
more opportunities to revolutionaries to prepare the revolution.  
The development of revolutionary movement: expanding the 
support bases, emergence of new features and radicalization. The 
evolvement of revolution phenomenon was connected not only with in-
creasing literacy level and advancement of printing, but also, and most 
importantly, with the expanding support bases of revolutions (engaging 
the bourgeoisie, townspeople, intelligentsia, workhands, etc.). In other 
words, in the course of revolutions their support bases increase and at 
a certain point engage the absolute majority of population. The Refor-
mation involved broad strata, yet, the peasantry would mostly stand back 
from the struggle. Meanwhile, when the peasantry made attempts to be-
come a social power, as it happened in Germany, their insurrections were 
ruthlessly suppressed. Although the Dutch revolution generated a new 
regime and new capitalist economy, as well as triggered the most power-
ful development of world trade, it still remained a national-liberation and 
religious struggle and was hardly related to internal contradictions. We 
should also add that the urbanization level in the Netherlands was un-
commonly high for that time (in the early sixteenth century in the South-
ern Netherlands there was up to 50 per cent of urban population, see 
Blockmans 1989: 734) while the peasantry largely became farmers. 
The English Revolution and the formed outlines of subsequent 
revolutions. The English Revolution was the first typical socio-political 
revolution. One should certainly regard it as the first great revolution due 
to its impact, the ideological boost for the future, and successful estab-
lishment of a new political regime. It introduced new realities and charac-
teristics into all subsequent revolutions. First of all, it was a liberal and 
anti-monarchical revolution that ideologically divided countries into those 
with the royal right as a source of supreme power and those where this 
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source was the popular right. The English Revolution also transformed 
the civil war into a means of solving the power matters. Certainly, civil 
wars (including those for religious reasons) were hardly something new in 
history. However, the revolutionary civil wars supporting monarchy or 
republic can be treated as a novel phenomenon. New ideological banners, 
new principles of the (revolutionary) army formation and new tactics 
leading to success, king's trial and execution – these are characteristics 
adopted by subsequent revolutions. 
Here one can also point to important changes in revolutionary ideo- 
logy, strategy and tactics which started to involve a powerful and fierce 
struggle via new forms of printed word and political journalism in ge- 
neral.19 Here we should remember the so-called pamphlet war. There also 
emerged political groups that later would lay the foundations for political 
parties. 
Meanwhile, the English Revolution followed a certain life-cycle: 
from the rise to decline of revolution and its transition into (Cromwell's) 
dictatorship, and later – to the restoration of the old system (of royal po- 
wer).20 But, of course, one cannot step in the same river twice in politics, so 
the Restoration appeared a swan song of the old monarchy even though the 
former revolutionaries were persecuted during that period (this was also  
a characteristic feature later recurring in other revolutions). The cycle was 
completed by a new and almost bloodless (‘velvet’) revolution of 1688, 
which marked the origin of constitutional monarchy (more details on the 
cycles of revolutionary uprisings see in the second part of the article). 
Finally, since it was more a political than religious matter and the 
struggle occurred between two political centers: the king and the parlia-
ment, the English Revolution showed that revolutions are necessarily the 
struggle for power and prospects of political building. 
The American Revolution was a struggle for independence in its 
form, but intrinsically it was a revolution. It was based on the ideas of the 
French Enlightenment; therefore, it introduced a number of innovations 
into revolutionary practice. These were, first, the declaration of rights, 
which became a common place in subsequent revolutions; second, the 
legitimacy of people's will, which becomes superior over the monarchial 
will; third, the constitution, which also became a commonplace in any 
revolution (since the English revolution had occurred much earlier there 
was no constitution in Britain but only a constitutional monarchy); and 
finally, a universal arming of the people also became a widespread prac-
tice (because there was no army in America). The American Revolution 
in many respects (except for terror and other excesses) can be called  
a rehearsal of the French Revolution (since some future French revolu-
tionaries passed a ‘practice run’ there). 
The French Revolution and the formation of classic features of 
revolutions. In this section we will briefly define new features resulting 
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from the French Revolution since we have no opportunity to talk about its 
history (we will briefly discuss it in the second part of the article). 
So, what new features did the French Revolution introduce in the 
perception of revolutions? First of all, this revolution obtained a broader 
support bases than the English Revolution, since the majority of popula-
tion, i.e., the peasantry, had joined the revolutionary process.  
Second, the French Revolution became profoundly social in order to 
solve issues of equality and land reformation. It raised in its entirety the 
problem of abolition of estates and total legal equality. All people became 
citizens.21  
Third, the Revolution had an evident anti-feudal (anti-liege) character 
since the former land and class relationships in rural areas would gradu- 
ally change. Along with other features this gave the Revolution a particu-
larly large scale. 
Fourth, certain changes occurred in ideology. On the one hand, the 
French revolution turned out to be fundamentally antireligious unlike 
the English Revolution, which tried to affirm the right to freedom of be-
lief. As a result, the desire not only to take away the church property, but 
also to undermine the very necessity of faith in God became characteristic 
of revolutions to come along with the attempts to impose a new secular 
ideology instead of the religious one.  
Fifth is the radicalization of revolution and constantly increasing de-
mands. In the course of its development any revolution becomes radical-
ized (it became already clear during the Reformation, when the Lutherans 
were forced to fight against the Anabaptists and other radical reformers). 
As Samuel Huntington (1968) notes the main struggle (especially in 
the West) usually unfolds between the moderates and the radicals. But the 
French Revolution made this tendency become especially evident. During 
the first five years of the Revolution one observed how the increasingly 
radical groups snatched power one from another, and in 1794, after the 
Thermidor, there were (failed) attempts of such coups on the part of 
the extreme left-wingers.  
Sixth (resulting from the fifth) is terror, which due to its unprece-
dented scale became a new (and mutually) dangerous weapon. 
Seventh are the new revolutionary bodies and societies which were 
the prototypes of revolutionary parties.  
While the English Revolution demonstrated that a revolution may re-
sult in civil war, the French revolution showed that the ousted elite may be 
even ready to welcome foreign forces in order to come back to power. The 
struggle against intervention determined the creation of the people's revo-
lutionary army and promoted emergence of new tactics as well as opportu-
nities for the promotion of talented commanders from the masses (this was 
also characteristic of the earlier revolutions). Thus, the foreign intervention 
and the struggle against it became a rather common feature of revolutions.  
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1.2. The heyday of Revolutions (the 19th – the first half of the 20th cen-
tury) 
Differentiation of revolutions. It is not without reason that the ninetenth 
century was called the Age of Revolutions (Hobsbawm 1996), yet, the 
twentieth century obviously surpassed it by the number. The increasing 
number of revolutions allows elaboration of their typology, since different 
states, societies and peoples had different problems and goals22; and 
moreover, there was a strengthening conviction that revolutions may help 
solve various problems. Earlier revolutions used to result from a combina-
tion of circumstances; meanwhile, in the twentieth century along with 
objective factors, respective ideology, criticism of the existing regime and 
aspirations for changes there appeared conscious and long-term efforts to 
prepare revolutions along with professionalization of the revolutionaries' 
activities. Finally, the following new features of revolutions were formed: 
1) revolutionary organizations, including secretive ones (it is not surpris-
ing that the old forms of such organizations, e.g., Masonic lodges, were 
also actively employed for this purpose); and 2) conscious and extensive 
agitation for revolution. 
It is interesting to note that there no religious revolutions took place in 
the nineteenth century (although the demands for freedom of religious be-
liefs became universal).23 Meanwhile, there is observed an advent of new 
types of revolutions. What are those types distinguished between the nine-
teenth and the first half of the twentieth century?24 
1. Revolutions implying what today would be called state-building, 
aiming at uniting the nations separated into many states but considering 
themselves as a single entity. First of all, we mean here Germany and 
Italy. With respect to the latter, it should be mentioned that this was one 
of the few, if not the only revolution that together with the state contribut-
ed to the unification of the country (Piemonte). Later Germany was united 
in a ‘top-down’ manner. But during the German revolution of 1848–1849 
the National Assembly worked there, albeit it was ineffective.  
2. Nationalist revolutions, when nations endeavored to gain inde-
pendence or autonomy. Nationalism accompanied industrialization, mo- 
dernization, and cultural development. In 1848–1849 such revolutions 
occurred, for example, in the Czech Republic and Hungary. It is worth 
noting that while nationalist revolutions became increasingly widespread 
and remain the same until present, the uniting revolutions appear a rare 
phenomenon.25 
3. Liberal-political revolutions, whose major task was to establish 
a certain form of democracy or of a more liberal political system and to 
expand rights and freedoms. These were, for example, the revolution of 
1830 in France, the revolutions of 1848–1849 in Austria, Prussia, and 
a number of German states. 
Grinin / Revolutions: An Insight into a Five Centuries' Trend 181 
4. Social/Socialist revolutions, where social issues were considered 
of paramout importance and the change of political regime was regarded 
as a means of achieving social objectives. At a certain stage the revolu-
tions of 1848 and of 1870–1871 in France were of this kind. But social 
revolutions of the type are characteristic already of the twentieth century, 
when after October 1917 they started to acquire socialist features. 
5. Anti-colonial revolutions (which started in 1812 in Latin America 
but in the twentieth century covered Asia and Africa).26 
The emergence of new information technologies, i.e., telegraph and 
telephone, led to a significantly increased intensity of revolutionary 
events. The information about revolutionary events would spread in light-
ning speed. So the response to them would also accelerate, if there were 
suitable conditions for it in the society. Revolutionaries and groups could 
move quickly by trains. Yet, this would change the government's tactics 
as well. 
We can also identify the following emerging phenomena in revo- 
lutions: 
1. The armed revolutionary rebellions in cities (we should note that 
the role of capitals particularly increased since the time of the French 
Revolution, although in a number of cases, e.g., in Latin America, one 
could observe the pattern of revolutionary movement spreading from the 
periphery). Respectively, such insurrections developed the revolutionary 
tactics of constructing barricades in narrow streets (which became charac-
teristic in the following century). The July Revolution of 1830 in France 
was the first such violent popular uprising. 
2. Internationalization of revolutionary movement. Although the first 
such ‘international’ was established by the European monarchs in 1815, 
after 1849 the Internationals became the most important part of revolu-
tionary movement. Their ideology was expressed in the slogans like ‘Pro-
letarians of All Countries, Unite!’ 
3. The establishment of revolutionary political parties (both legal and 
illegal). 
4. The definition of support bases proper which expanded (involving 
proletariat, intelligentsia, and with increasing education – students) and 
systematic propaganda among these strata. 
5. The emergence of ideologies promoting the proletariat to the lea- 
ding position while downgrading the role of peasantry and the lower mid-
dle class. 
6. The increasing role of intelligentsia in revolutionary ideology and 
revolutionary actions. 
7. Newspapers as the most important information ideological weapon. 
It is characteristic that the revolutionary events of the nineteenth and 
even early twentieth centuries were not associated with mass terror, alt-
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hough in certain cases the governments would resort to massive repres-
sion of the insurgents. 
However, the spreading revolutionary ideologies aimed at radical 
changes in society and property redistribution etc., there emerged new 
ideas and tactics implying the seizure of power via a successful rebellion 
(blanquism). Another tactics which was established and unfortunately, 
became a curse of our age, was revolutionary terrorism (first it was an indi-
vidual terror against the authorities aiming at revenge, or to manifest one-
self and intimidate the authorities but later it transformed into mass terror 
against casual people). Undoubtedly, that was the new means of infor-
mation distribution (when people would quickly learn about terrorist at-
tacks) that to a great extent supported the development of this tactics. Per-
haps, the Italian Carbonari were the first to employ it, and it was also ac-
tively used by the Irish nationalists. At that the political terror against the 
head of state was probably the invention of the Russian populists. 
The strengthening socialist ideology in the revolutions of the 
nineteenth – early twentieth centuries. The development of industry, 
increasing number of workers and urban population, general humanization 
of life, along with the need to maintain hygiene and order in cities, etc., led 
to the growing requirements to the minimal level of living standards and 
hygiene and social guarantees from the part of a society. Here also adds the 
emergence of such type of social disaster as economic crisis which could 
significantly aggravate the workers' economic situation. Meanwhile, the 
concentration of working people in certain places and at enterprises facili-
tated their organization and struggle for the rights (and also made them 
a powerful source of social instability as well as revolutionary force). 
Simultaneously, we can observe intensifying sympathy with the working 
class on the part of the well-off layers of the society and intelligentsia. 
For a long time growing production volumes combined with existing or 
even increasing social stratification and a gap in the living standards (in 
current terms, the Gini coefficient was high and sometimes substantially 
increased). All this would reinforce socialist ideologies focusing both on 
criticism of reality and on projects of social restructuring. The Revolution 
in Paris in July 1848 turned into a social one along with the subsequent 
revolution of 1870–1871 (the Paris Commune). 
The peculiar features of social revolutions made them transform into 
socialist ones (as in case of the Paris Commune). Thus, the increasing radi-
calization of such revolutions was explained by the fact that the most im-
portant societal institution, i.e., private property, was challenged. This al-
ready meant an extreme and drastic reorganization of the whole social 
structure and most of a society's institutions. As a result, the public con-
sciousness developed along an important path of growing popularity of 
the ideology of radical social changes via revolutions, when the latter 
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were claimed to be the key to the kingdom of the future fair society, some-
thing like a bridge from prehistory to real history.  
The socialist revolution in Russia ran much further than its prede-
cessors both in terms of terror and of radical social changes. 
We should note the following new revolutionary technologies which 
emerged in the course of that revolution. 
1. The establishment of a totalitarian party, which became the most 
important revolutionary weapon that succeeded to integrate even regions 
with different ethnic characteristics. At the same time, the idea of a com-
plete monopoly of power was reinforced not immediately, but already in 
the course of the Civil War and after the victory it became the basis of 
a new system. The totalitarian party internationally appeared a completely 
new phenomenon. 
2. Totalitarian power, that is, a complete monopoly on power in all 
its forms, not only in the political sphere but also in economic and spiritu-
al ones. We already observed such a turn during the French Revolution, 
but it was short-run. Now this was the basis of a new socio-political re-
gime and would be reproduced in different versions in other societies. 
3. A significant expansion of revolutionary time frames within which 
the return to normal life was incomplete. This was caused by the fact that 
the social breakdown turned out to be extremely radical; thereafter, the re-
sistance to it and terror against actually and potentially dissatisfied people 
were very strong. The scale and ideas of social breakdown were so im-
mense and the number of potential enemies of those ideas was so large that 
it took a long time to realize them. 
The previously employed revolutionary methods were more actively 
and widerly used. These included mass terror and execution of hostages, 
creation of a special punitive body, and involvement of military special-
ists from socially hostile environment with their families' lives at stake; 
creation of revolutionary committees at grassroots levels, mass distribu-
tion of new revolutionary authorities, and a complete reorganization of 
the whole governmental system. 
The Chinese socialist revolution is the only great revolution which 
witnessed revolutionary movement spreading not from the center but from 
periphery. The Chinese revolution was completed in the course of a new 
stage of the civil war in 1946–1949, when the Chinese People's Liberation 
Army led by Mao Tse-Tung and his military leaders marched triumphant-
ly from remote inner lands of the country to the capital. Such tactics was 
typical for the American revolutions but not the European ones. 
1.3. The diminishing role of revolutions in historical process (the 
19th century – the second half of the 20th century – the beginning of 
the 21st century) 
In the period between the 1950s and 1990s there occurred many revolu-
tions that captured peripheral or at best semi-peripheral countries, so their 
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role was hardly significant for historical process. Here we can mention 
several socialist revolutions (the completed revolutions in Vietnam and 
Cuba), a number of national liberation movements that turned into bloody 
wars, including civil wars (Algeria, Mozambique, and Angola) and the 
already mentioned Iranian revolution. 
At the same time, a great number of ‘revolutions’ were actually mili-
tary coups, although they seem full-fledged revolutions with respect to 
change of political regime (from monarchy/dictatorship to republic or 
people's republic, jamahiriya, etc.), the scale of changes, social perturba-
tions and resultant increasing activity of people's forces. The most famous 
here are the 1952 revolution in Egypt, as well as several coups in the 
Middle East, including the 1969 revolution in Libya led by Muammar 
Gaddafi. 
This kind of revolutions can be called modernization revolution since 
it strats with a definite purpose of accelerating a country's development 
(meanwhile, the choice of socio-political path or regime is determined 
mostly by the considerations of momentary advantage). We observed 
revolutions of this kind in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (e.g., 
in Latin America, Turkey). 
The anti-socialist revolutions against totalitarian regimes became 
a new type of revolutions. Those were revolutions in Hungary in 1956, in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1981. They can be regarded to 
some extent as national liberation, since their aim was disengagement 
from the USSR influence. This also explains why some of them were ini-
tiated from above. 
Finally, the year 1989 witnessed a revolutionary wave in the European 
socialist countries. Some of them were ‘velvet’, like the revolution in 
Czechoslovakia. Yet, not all of them (including the revolutionary move-
ments in the former USSR republics) can be considered as genuine revolu-
tions since they associated with a geopolitical cataclysm, namely, with 
a rapidly reducing sphere of influence and collapse of the Soviet Union 
which brought the formation of a unipolar world. 
As to the ‘velvet’ revolutions, the history of similar political coups 
started with the English Glorious Revolution of 1688. Several revolutions 
of the kind took place in the last decades and we can in particular mention 
the ‘Carnation Revolution’ of 1974 in Portugal. As a rule, such revolu-
tions make the last act of revolutionary changes, that is, they complete 
a rather long history of attempts at democratic transformations and previ-
ous revolutions so they usually pass rather quickly and nonviolently. If 
a society is not modernized enough, the ‘velvet’ revolution will hardly 
occur since great changes can hardly proceed easily. Therefore, even if 
the first stage of revolution passes quickly and nonviolently, the further 
revolutionary steps may bring exacerbation and reinforced internal strug-
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gle. The latter may be exemplified by the events in Egypt in 2011 that 
triggered daunting violence of exceedingly bloody terrorist acts. 
The last wave of revolutions is represented by the so-called ‘color 
revolutions’ (for more details see Grinin et al. 2016: Introduction). These 
revolutions have become a tool of geopolitical struggle and this complete-
ly reduces their role as a factor of historical progress. On the other hand, 
some of modern revolutions were not ‘color’. So while there are debates 
concerning the role of external influence in the events of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, in my opinion, these revolutions 
were generally caused by internal processes and forces, despite the fact 
that the protesters' position was greatly improved by the pressure on the 
governments (e.g., Hosni Mubarak's) on the part of the USA and other 
countries with respect to prohibitions on the use of military actions.27 
Therefore, we have examined the five century's path from great revolu-
tions to ‘velvet’ and then to ‘color’ ones. What conclusion can we make? 
Anyway, we see that at a certain point revolutions somehow reach 
their heyday. We mean that starting from the early Modern Era it is just 
the revolutions that advanced the leading societies into the mainstream of 
historical process. Later revolutions started to shift to the semi-peripheral 
soceities, yet, the latter would fail to become the societies which by 
means of revolutions could pave the way for the rest. Thus, the revolu-
tions gradually lost their role as a driver of progress and in 1917–1949 
they mostly contributed to the development of an alternative trajectory of 
historical development (in particular, socialism). Since then their creative 
potential has been constantly decreasing.28 Time will show what the new 
revolutions will be like. Perhaps, they will involve countries with sustain-
able democracy which previously managed to escape revolutions (due to 
other legal and institutional mechanisms for changes available in such 
societies). The recent events in the USA or Spain (in Catalonia) prove that 
modern democratic societies are not always capable to resolve conflicts 
precisely in institutional terms, so the majority of their citizens are ready 
to get their ways through a direct struggle and by means of claims which 
obviously contradict the constitution and the fundamental laws of the 
country. 
Section 2. ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY 
The first paragraph of this section links it with Section 1. The second para-
graph deals with an important aspect of phases of the cycle that revolutions 
and post-revolutionary epochs pass. Finally, the third paragraph refers to 
psychological aspects of the elite before and during the revolution. 
2.1. About information technologies 
We have mentioned that revolutions are closely related to new infor-
mation technologies and actively use them for their own purposes. We 
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should note that every new revolutionary epoch employs its own means: 
the English Revolution made a wide use of pamphlets and other publicist 
and agitation literature (the newspapers were not a serious political wea- 
pon yet). The development of mail also promoted dissemination of infor-
mation; in particular, it greatly facilitated communication among revolu-
tionaries, although it also provided the secret police with a powerful 
means to reveal the discontented. Pamphlets played a great role before 
and in the course of the French Revolution. Yet, pamphlets already gave 
way to political newspapers. Successful pamphlets became periodic, as, 
for example, the well-known Marat's pamphlet ‘The People's Friend’ 
(L'Ami du peuple). As a result, the political newspapers of the kind be-
came the main type of journalism. Along with common newspapers, 
(which generally disseminated news) they became the leading infor-
mation technology in the ninetenth century along with books, magazines 
and leaflets (pamphlets also continued to play a significant role). A well-
known example for the Russians is ‘The New Rheinische Zeitung’, for 
which K. Marx made contributions during the revolution of 1848–1849. 
For a very long time newspapers remained the most important form of 
revolutionary agitation. The more mail and distribution system of news-
papers were developed, the more important role they played. But new 
opportunities for revolutions were provided with the emergence of tele-
graph and telephone.29 The opportunities for revolutionary mobilization 
significantly increased with development of the Internet and social net-
works. We should note that although in the twentieth century there were 
invented fundamentally new media, namely, radio and television (in addi-
tion to cinema and newsreels), they hardly played as important role in revo-
lutionary waves as newspapers or social networks did. On the contrary, 
along with cinema they became a rather powerful support for the emerging 
totalitarian regimes. In our opinion, this is explained by the fact that these 
media are more centralized unlike newspapers and social networks, so it is 
easier for governments to control them. Television is the media, which re-
quires huge investments (unlike newspapers and even radio); therefore, the 
revolutionary opposition is unlikely to widely use them.30 Moreover, it was 
extremely difficult to get access to such means under conditions of hard-
line regimes, while within a true democracy the political ambitions are 
aimed at victory at the election and not at barricades. Therefore, the 
emergence of computer technologies and especially of the Internet and 
social networks, which are decentralized unlike television and able to 
purposefully impact a huge number of users, played a critical part for the 
new wave of revolutions in the 2000s. 
2.2. Stages of revolutionary changes31 
Revolution, the Thermidorian law and reaction. The fact that revolutions 
and epochs generally associated with them, may pass through similar stages 
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was discussed already at the end of the eighteenth century. It became even 
more evident after the end of the period associated with the Great French 
Revolution and the Bourbon Restoration (see above on Maistre). A centu-
ry later, after the October Revolution this became clear for the majority of 
intelligentsia. One of the ideas was that a revolutionary tide should be fol-
lowed by a low tide. ‘Every revolution ends in reaction. It is inevitable, it is 
a law’ wrote the famous Russian thinker Nikolay Berdyaev (Berdyaev 
1990: 29).32 There was another name for the reaction – the Thermidor, 
which originated from the French Revolution.33 The Russian intellectuals 
who did not support the October revolution, but realized that it had to be 
accepted and recognized as an indisputable fact as well as act suitably, 
could think and dream of the Thermidor after the October events, which 
would allow the country and them to return to their former life at least to 
some extent. That is why, already in 1921, Nikolay Ustryalov gave the 
title ‘The Way of Thermidor’ to the second part of his article ‘Patriotica’ 
published in Prague in his seminal collection ‘Smena vekh’ [Change of 
Landmarks]34 (Ustryalov 1921). He offered to accept the fact of the revo-
lution and expect a transition to the Thermidor, that is to a reasonable 
account of reality. ‘A difficult task – but may God give it success!’ – he 
exclaimed. Ustryalov started his research by pointing that he was not the 
first to talk about Thermidor in the context of the Russian Revolution. 
The Kronstadt rebellion was a signal that made some Russian publicists in 
Paris start talking about the ‘Russian Thermidor’. In particular, several 
articles in the Russian-language newspaper ‘The Latest News’ edited by 
Pavel Milyukov (who was, by the way, a very intelligent historian) were 
devoted to establishing an analogy between the process which had oc-
curred in Russia and the Thermidorian period of the Great French Revolu-
tion. Ustryalov tried to define to what extent these analogies were valid 
and what was the ‘Thermidorian path’ like, and he came to the conclusion 
that it was of small importance whether the overthrow of former revolu-
tionary idols and the alteration of the direction would take place, or 
the actual leaders would appear quite pragmatic to change the direction. 
The matter is that the Thermidorian path implies a transformation of 
the very fabric of revolution as well as of its actors' souls and hearts. 
As a result the revolution is released from its own superfluity and passes 
to a reasonable consideration of the situation (Ibid.). 
The transition to NEP actually brought hope for the Thermidorian 
Reaction in the Russian revolution. But Ustryalov, Milyukov, and other 
researchers did not account that the very revolutionary pattern had 
changed in the course of historical process and that unlike the French 
Revolution which experienced only a rather short period of terror, the 
Russian revolution would witness a new round of revolutionary changes 
starting nine years after the expected Thermidor, along with a new round 
of social terror which would almost surpass the revolutionary one by the 
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scale of destruction. Moreover, terror had to become a permanent feature 
(later the Chinese and some other socialist revolutions would follow the 
same path). 
Several years later after the discussion of the Thermidorian path 
among the Russian emigration, Leo Trotsky and his supporters, who suf-
fered a defeat in the intraparty strife, spoke about the party Thermidor.35 It 
is important to take into account that the Trotskyists adhered to the left-
wing positions implying an increasing activity of the world revolution and 
accepting the impossibility of building socialism in a separate country 
while Joseph Stalin and his supporters intended to build socialism in the 
USSR without waiting for the world revolution (which hopes became 
more and more delusive). 
Thus, the transition from violent destruction of social and other rela-
tions and the apogee of violence and terror to a more moderate policy is 
considered to be regularity for some revolutions. In this context, we 
should point an interesting fact that in Soviet historiography they were 
reluctant to accept the presence of such regularity not only in socialist, but 
even in the bourgeois revolution. In particular, the Great French Revolu-
tion was dated back to 1789−1794 (see Manfred 1974), whereas it is 
widely recognized (including the contemporary Russian historiography) 
that though with less intensity the revolution actually lasted until Napole-
on seized the power. In 1795 the new Constitution of France was adopted 
and the Convention was respectively dismissed. There was established the 
Directory, which was a collective state government consisting of five di-
rectors. After the coup of 18th Brumaire, Napoleon formally replaced the 
Directory by the Consulate, which remained a revolutionary body until 
1804 (when Napoleon was declared an Emperor).  
Ideology and the Thermidorian law. Therefore, ideology is the most 
important element of revolution. Naturally, ideology is always an out-
come of: 1) common material causes: technological development, popula-
tion growth, urbanization, literacy growth, etc.; and 2) socio-economic de-
mands, needs, and aspirations. But, naturally, it is always the result of 
intellectual and spiritual work of a group of leaders/ideologists or intelli-
gentsia. The result often depends on a number of historical features, as 
well as the ideologists' individual reasons and spiritual inclinations. 
Despite the fact that ideology is related to objective factors (in the 
sense that the emergence of ideology may be caused by various changes 
and processes), it is always inherently detached from practice since it as-
pires for perfection and ideal. Hence, the practical implementation of ide-
ology always faces reality that later becomes a more formidable obstacle. 
It is so typical of revolutionaries to overcome obstacles regardless of costs; 
for them, on the contrary, the steeper the breakdown – the better. In this 
context, the deeper the ideology is implemented, the stronger are the emerg-
ing contradictions. After all, politics is the art of achieving the possible. The 
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attempts to introduce a pure ideology always end with severe problems as 
well as with the inevitable departure from revolutionary ideals. 
What does the Thermidor law mean with respect to revolutionary 
ideology and revolution? It shows that we need a compromise between 
traditions, common sense, practical needs and revolutionary ideology. 
Thermidor is considered to be a serious attempt of pragmatic search for 
the ways to complete revolution (Polyakova 2014). This usually does not 
mean an open break with revolutionary ideology, but life brings its own 
rules. Therefore, to continue to stay in power a revolutionary regime 
needs to create a governmental system that will somehow restrain fantasy 
and take the account of objective laws of life. Sometimes this requires the 
adjustment of ideology, otherwise, they pretend that the existing situation 
is just what was planned to achieve. But, anyway, eventually there 
emerge different variations of relying on reality. We can observe how 
they start ‘wind down’ from a great utopia towards a sound approach to 
a renewed reality and devotion to it (Ustryalov 1921).36 
The radical ideology can become efficient only if imposed in bal-
anced and ‘diluted’ manner, like a highly concentrated substance. Other-
wise it causes harm or even death. Socialism was exactly that radical ide-
ology, which could be imposed only in a gradual and partial manner and 
in certain spheres. As practice showed this could give a positive effect 
and become an important part of system only in certain periods of time or 
in particular societies. The consequences of attempts to build life accor- 
ding to this ideology were bad. This also refers to fervent nationalism and 
religious ideology (e.g., Islamism). Thus, although it may seem cynical, 
the loyal adherents of ideology lead society to deplorable results, whereas 
opportunists can lead it to more successful results. 
The radical ideology like revolutions, in general, brings the greatest 
benefit when its supporters, being in opposition, put forward the slogans 
and demands, which more pragmatic ruling elites have to take into ac-
count and somehow realize.  
The Thermidor law manifests in a peculiar way in societies that objec-
tively do not yet reach the level when revolutions become inevitable. How-
ever, in more developed countries certain groups and mass media are 
formed due to borrowing of ideologies and practices of revolutions, as 
a result, social protests and discontent are canalized into an objectively 
higher social form than one should expect. In our opinion this was the case 
with revolutions in the East at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 
such case a return to dictatorship may occur quite quickly, as it happened as 
a result of the Xinhai revolution in China. 
A revolutionary cycle. The history of the French Revolution clearly 
showed that a revolution follows a life-cycle. Schematically it can be pre-
sented in the following way. First, there is observed an escalation of revo-
lution. Then, either more radical revolutionaries come to power, or there 
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occurs radicalization of forces in power (but, of course, there occurs 
a dissociation within the revolutionary camp). Finally, a revolution and 
terror reach their apogee.37 Then, when the support of the revolution re-
duces since the society becomes tired of it, and economy declines (as well 
as when the main military threats recede), there occurs certain backslide. 
This comes as a natural reaction to the overreach and can be manifested in 
fierce discussions, splits, direct struggle within the revolutionary camp 
and sometimes even in physical elimination of the most radical revolu-
tionaries are of (as it occurred in France at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury). Then there would start the Thermidorian period which could have 
several stages. For example, with respect to the USSR one could speak 
first about the revolutionary Thermidor associated with the introduction 
of the new economic program at the 10th Congress of the RCP(B) and the 
‘tightening of the screws’ via reinforcement of the party discipline (the 
prohibition of factions, etc.), and then also about the political Thermidor 
(Trotsky dated it start to 1924 [Trotsky 1935], but this became especially 
noticeable after the years 1927–1928), when as a result of fierce party 
discussions, there was made a decision about the possibility of building 
socialism in an particular country. By 1929 all opposition movements had 
been eliminated, and their leaders were sidelined (Trotsky was exiled), 
and later repressed. As to the party discipline ‘the screws have been tight-
ened’ strong enough. It is interesting that the end of the Thermidorian 
coup in the party coincided with a new revolutionary tide of 1929–1933, 
after which the peasant property was abolished, and the peasantry as 
a class (social group) was actually transformed into state-owned serfs.  
Later, as shown by the English Revolution and the French revolutions 
of the late eighteenth century and 1848, the throwback of the revolution 
(Thermidor) could continue and transform into the regime of personal 
dictatorship which could later evolve into a kind of monarchy. While in 
Britain Cromwell's dictatorship did not become a monarchy,38 in France, 
in cases of both revolutions, the republic changed into empire. This re-
gime was called Bonapartism. The dual character of this regime which 
was neither republican nor monarchic in traditional sense (since the new 
emperor was treated as an usurper) was expressed in peculiar characteris-
tics associated with the attempts to maneuver between different strata of 
society, to change the course, and to gain popular support. It was Karl 
Marx who first spoke about Bonapartism in a broad sense in ‘The Eight-
eenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ written in connection with the mili-
tary coup carried out by Napoleon I’s nephew, Louis Bonaparte, who was 
the President of the French Republic from 1848. A year later he became 
Emperor Napoleon III.39 Thus, as Marx noted (Marx 1957: 141), the revo-
lution proceeds downward. The term ‘Bonapartism’ initially denoted the 
post-revolutionary dictatorship, and later it started to define any regime of 
personal power maneuvering between different social forces, and was and 
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is currently used in the political discourse. In particular, Trotsky em-
ployed it in the above-mentioned article when speaking about Stalin's 
regime (Trotsky 1935).  
Thus, we may conclude that every revolution is a jump ahead; this 
especially refers to great revolutions which can go too far in the matter of 
social destruction.40 At some stage this leads to a backslide. Revolutions 
are often an attempt to organize life not in accordance with practical crite-
ria, but with ideological patterns. But this gap between aspirations for 
embodiment of revolutionary ideal in practice and the realities that hardly 
fit the bookish model cannot last for a long time. Hence, a slowdown of 
the revolutionary wave (Thermidor) is inevitable along with the subse-
quent return to the previously existing norms (Bonapartism).  
On the assumption of aforementioned, we can distinguish several sta- 
ges within the revolutionary period (but this certainly applies only to a suc-
cessful revolution). Some of them, like R. R. Vakhitov, define three stages: 
with respect to the Great French Revolution ‘They are usually called, Jaco-
binism, Thermidor and Bonapartism respectively’ (Vakhitov 2004). But 
that is not quite true. The fact is that Jacobinism can in no way be the first 
stage. Jacobinism is the apotheosis of the revolution, and this peak is pre-
ceded by at least two periods (of an easy victory of revolution and of in-
creasing revolutionary demands), then a more radical force may come to 
power and only then there starts extreme radicalization (Jacobinism). Let 
us consider the revolution of 1917. One can count at least two main stages 
prior to the October events: for example, before April 1917 and from 
April to October. And then there was a period before the start of the Bol-
shevik terror in summer 1918; thus, this just period up to 1920 can be 
considered a peak (Jacobinism).  
We have also mentioned above that there might be such stages as res-
toration and then a recurrent revolution (like the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 in Britain). On the other hand, some stages may be absent in the 
course of a particular revolution. 
2.3. The elite losing the sense of self-preservation 
We should start the discussion with the statement that was expressed in 
the literature, but, unfortunately, did not become widespread. Meanwhile, 
it deserves considerable attention. The point is that the ruling elite, as well 
as the closely adjacent strata, seem to lose their sense for self-preser- 
vation41 during certain difficult periods, including the initial revolutionary 
phases. They appear simply unprepared to unite when facing the immi-
nent danger of popular unrest and to support an unstable authority which 
is much closer to them despite all its shortcomings and flaws. They either 
express discontent with the existing power, or directly agitate against it, 
welcoming the revolutionaries and oncoming revolution, or even directly 
participate in revolution. The perception comes only in the course of 
revolution, especially after the revolutionary breakdown engages wider 
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population and various institutions and terror is used for such a break-
down, sometimes even after the revolution. Thus, between February and 
March 1917 all the commanders of the fronts supported the revolution in 
Petrograd, none of them supported the Emperor and the commander-in-
chief Nicholas II; on the contrary, everyone advised him to abdicate from 
the throne. And only later did they realize that the revolution, which they 
hoped would somehow intensify military activities, led Russia to military 
defeat and catastrophe. ‘Betrayal, cowardice and deception is every-
where!’ – wrote Nicholas II in his diary on March 2, 1917 (The Diaries… 
1991: 625). But the emperor himself did not show any will to power at 
this decisive moment; on the contrary, he hurried to abdicate, as if this 
was a good reason to cast off the burden of rule. Then his brother Mikhail 
easily renounced the throne, which had been strengthening for 300 years, 
and none of the royal family decided to lead the struggle for preservation 
of monarchy. In 1991 and 1992, the leaders of the Communist Party of 
the USSR and the newly emerged Communist Party of Russia easily al-
lowed destroying both the USSR and the CPSU. In 1993 during the oppo-
sition between the President and the Supreme Council many of them were 
to pay for it. 
However, such a loss of will to power and of a sense of self-
preservation is characteristic not only for Russia but also for many other 
revolutionary epochs. 
In May 1789 in Paris the Estates General were gathered which consist-
ed of the elected representatives of the three estates. However, as a result, 
many representatives of nobility and clergy would join the representatives 
of the third estate to form a revolutionary Constituent Assembly, whose 
decrees actually triggered the Great French Revolution. Meanwhile, the 
French nobility and clergy enjoyed exceptional privileges.42 
We should note that the instinct for self-preservation along with the 
perception of necessary struggle for power and for preservation of one's 
positions can be lost during other crucial epochs as well. Thus, in 1939–
1940 after surrender of France to the enemy already after the first defeat, 
the French military leaders looked amazingly helpless and unwilling to 
sacrifice anything for the sake of the country. This awesome cowardice 
(after a powerful activity during the First World War), however, became 
apparent already from the mid-1930s, when France would lose one posi-
tion after another to rising but still weak Germany. 
In 1909 soon after the first Russian Revolution a famous miscellany 
‘Vekhi’ appeared with the subtitle ‘A collection of articles about the Rus-
sian intelligentsia’ (Vekhi 1909).43 It was actually devoted to the Russian 
Revolution and role of intelligentsia in it. In Nikolay Berdyaev's article 
‘Philosophical Truth and the Moral Truth of the Intelligentsia’ from this 
collection, the intelligentsia's position was sharply criticized. In Ber-
dyaev's opinion, the Russian intelligentsia practically worshipped the 
Grinin / Revolutions: An Insight into a Five Centuries' Trend 193 
people and revolution, while the struggle against autocracy became the 
criterion of assessing any phenomenon. At the same time, the intelligent-
sia ‘has always blamed external forces for everything, thus justifying it-
self’ (Berdyaev 1909: 26) thus, forgetting about the truth, and about the 
fact that one has to take the responsibility and ‘stop blaming it all on ex-
ternal forces’ (Ibid.). In the article ‘Creative Self-Consciousness’ a histo-
rian, literary critic and philosopher Mikhail Gershenzon (who initiated the 
publication of the collection of papers) wrote:  
What did our intellectuals do over the last half a century? – I'm 
talking, of course, about the intelligentsia. A bunch of revolu-
tionaries went from house to house and knocked on every door: 
‘Everybody, right outside! It's a shame to sit at home!’ – and 
everybody... poured out into the square ... Half a century they 
are hanging about in the square, shouting and swearing. They 
have dirt, poverty, and mess at home, but the owner is out. He is 
in public, he saves the people – and it is easier and more amus-
ing than common labour at home (Gershenzon 1909: 84). 
This particular intelligentsia claimed for power, showing a kind of 
messianship and believing that educated people are supposed to know 
how to reorganize life in a proper way. And without the slightest doubt, 
they were ready to reorganize it not from below but through claims for par-
ticipation in power and even for the supreme power (as the leaders of the 
Cadet Party used to). All this turned fatal for our country's history and the 
pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia of which many nobles were a part. 
However, one would think, that after the First Russian Revolution, it 
would have been necessary to reconsider the situation, to understand 
that the people's revolution would sweep away not only the autocracy, 
but also the intelligentsia. Gershenzon wrote about it quite frankly: ‘The 
way we are we can hardly even dream of merging with the people − we 
must be scared of it more than any executions of power and bless that 
power, which with its bayonets and prisons still alone protects us from the 
people's rage’ (Gershenzon 1909). But these words produced an opposite 
reaction. The author was condemned by every conceivable allegation. 
However, we are well aware of what happened with the Russian intelli-
gentsia as a result. Those whom the steamboats took abroad in 1922 were 
lucky, since they would not be drowned on barges in rivers.  
Thus, the elite or some its strata, figuratively speaking, quite often 
bite the feeding hand without understanding that they can exist only under 
this ‘bad’ in their opinion regime. The Soviet creative upper classes, 
which had peculiar privileges and a huge audience and was provided with 
food and lodging thanks to the state's policy, demanded freedom of 
speech, thinking that one could have freedom of speech, including unre-
strained criticism of power, and still preserve the former protection from 
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the state. Meanwhile, did those people standing at the top of culture be-
fore 1991 achieve anything simply remarkable, not to speak of great? One 
cans hardly remember, there was almost nothing … The fact is that the 
creative intelligentsia could exist only under the Soviet regime, but not 
the market economy. 
Why does this loss of sense for self-preservation happen? This issue 
needs a further exploration. But we can assume that it is the result of the 
following factors:  
1. A certain effeminacy of the elite which ceases to fight for its posi-
tions. In the fifteenth century a similar case was described by Ibn-
Khaldun (Ibn-Khaldun 1980; see also: Grinin 2011: 83−84) when the 
third-generation rulers due to their propensity for luxury and similar stuff 
would bring a dynasty to fall. 
2. The increasing level of education and of humanization of relations 
among the elite, in their families when the strictest relations are concealed 
from children, etc. In this situation, some members of the new generation 
are ‘infected’ with ideas hardly combining with their position. 
3. Foreign influence on the part of societies with superior cultural 
level and relations in society; the elite focuses on them (to some extent), 
yet they appear improper for domestic affairs. 
4. A rather soft (not too repressive) regime and ruler. 
5. Raising awareness that elite should be formed by merit persons 
and not due a birthright or other particular rights. 
6. Overproduction of elite. On the one hand, a great number of people 
lose touch with elite but still claim for the place of honor. Moreover, since 
a part of the generation inherits its position with little effort while the as-
pirations for a place in the elite increase the criticism of the elite also in-
tensifies. As a result, many representatives of the elite acutely perceive 
any criticism of the upper strata and government. 
7. Long-lasting criticism of the government makes some members of 
the elite take it seriously and believe that they can change the situation. 
Here manifests a significant role of ideology, which penetrates all strata 
of society and not only the more discontented people. 
CONCLUSION. REVOLUTIONS AS A GEOPOLITIC WEAPON 
Revolutions as a geopolitical weapon and overground and underground 
politics of a state began to be used systematically in the twentieth century 
(although they were used sporadically earlier, for example, when boosting 
the uprisings in nineteenth-century Poland against the power of Russia). 
During the First World War, Britain and France supported cadets and other 
oppositionists who stood against monarchy and, in fact, called for a revolu-
tion (and according to some reports the embassies to some extent coordi-
nated these intrigues). There are different points of view on the position 
of our allies concerning the revolution, one of them argues that by means 
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of revolution they sought to immediately achieve two goals: to continue 
taking advantage of Russia as an actively fighting ally and to find an op-
portunity to avoid keeping their promises to transfer the Black Sea straits 
and Constantinople to Russia. As you know, Germany tried (and rather 
succeeded) to play revolutionaries especially the Bolsheviks, headed by 
Lenin, who advocated for an immediate war termination. In fact, immedi-
ately after the October Revolution the USSR systematically promoted rev-
olutions and this became a constant element of its foreign policy (see Gri- 
nin 2017c). The Western countries less frequently made use of revolutions. 
There have also been failed attempts to export Islamic revolutions.  
The collapse of socialism, as we have mentioned above, have com-
pletely proved that revolutions are no longer an acceptable means of so-
cial progress in the modern period. But paradoxically, since that time that 
the USA and the Western countries have reversed their attitude to revolu-
tions and regard them today as positive and beneficial phenomena for 
Western countries (since there is no longer a threat of the emergence of 
communist regimes as a result of the revolution). As before the revolu-
tions are again associated with democracy while the latter has been rec-
ognized as an undoubtedly positive form. However, this is not true.  
As we see, the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-
first century has become a period of a new type of revolution with in-
creasing share of external interference and incitation, the use of ‘man-
made’ and non-spontaneous revolutions to overthrow undesirable re-
gimes. A chain of such revolutions, called ‘colored’, swept through 
a number of countries. As it has already been mentioned, the Western 
countries used these revolutions as a major geopolitical means to 
strengthen their influence and undermine the power of rivals, as well as 
to propagate the superiority of their own regime. For this purpose, in the 
target countries they actively supported opposition which was preferably 
trained by Western instructors; NGOs and diplomatic missions of all 
kinds were used as coordinators and headquarters. Unfortunately, most 
often the positive effect of such revolutions was minimal while the nega-
tive consequences turned destructive. Even a supporter of such revolu-
tions Jack Goldstone notes that ‘In most countries where ‘the color revo-
lutions’ took place there occurred no rapid and reliable transition to de-
mocracy’ (Goldstone 1991); he also shows that revolutions continue to 
start with the overthrow of the old regime, but they await a complicated 
and long-lasting process of establishing a new one. Revolutions inevitably 
cause new difficulties along with another struggle for power and good 
chance of lapsing into authoritarian regime (Ibid.: 161, 183). The idea that 
revolution is a very destructive way of progress for modern social life is 
confirmed again and again (see Grinin 1997, 2007). And we do not share 
Goldstone's hopes that ‘revolutionary heroism, and not revolutionary 
nightmares’ will prevail in the future (Goldstone 1991). 
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* The study has been supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Project
No. 17-06-00476). 
1 On October 31, 1517, Martin Luther, Doctor of Theology at the University of 
Wittenberg nailed his famous Ninety-five Theses, in which he sharply criticized the 
existing practices of the Catholic Church, in particular the sale of indulgences. 
2 Although some features of the coming revolutions were already manifested 
in the Hussite movement and in some uprisings in Italy in the 14th century. 
3 For example, the reforms conducted in the fourteenth-century B.C. by Uru-
inimgina who was probably elected the ruler of Lagash after the popular uprising 
(Dyakonov 1951; 1983: 207–274; 2000: 55–56); about similar uprisings and the 
establishment of a peculiar form of government see also Shtyrbul 2006. 
4 Among the Chinese popular uprisings the Taiping Rebellion of 1850−1864 
is the most similar to revolution (see, e.g., Ilyushechkin 1967). 
5 Of course, we can denote it progressive one only in the final account (since 
revolutions proved to be a rather costly way of development and sometimes tem-
porarily threw society back). 
6 However, as we will see below, in the twentieth century due to the chang-
ing historical role of revolutions, the latter could bring a society to the non-
mainstream path of development. Such paths were socialism and fascism (e.g., in 
Spain); the religious revolution in Iran can also be referred here. 
7 For the analysis of some of these conditions see Grinin 2017b. 
8 Not without reason the revolutions, if they ever occurred in antiquity and 
medieval period, would outbreak in urban societies where the level of literacy was 
relatively high. 
9 On the great revolutions and their role see Grinin 2017b. We should note 
here that great revolutions or something that substituted them occurred with the 
interval of about half a century after the beginning of the Great French Revolu-
tion. In 1848−1849 the European revolutions occurred, and then in 1905 a re- 
volutionary wave emerged in Russia. In China, the revolution succeeded in 1949, 
yet it actually lasted for twenty years more.  
10 We define the early modern period from the late fifteenth century, as it is 
conventional in Western historiography and was accepted in pre-revolutionary 
historiography in Russia and increasingly spread among the contemporary Rus-
sian historiographers. 
11 We should note that believers were not advised to read the Bible by them-
selves, and the number of copies was limited, since it was mostly rewritten (alt-
hough it was printed in the fifteenth century, which, in fact, appeared the basis for 
ripening of religious unrest). 
12 However, the change of dynasties became a very important institutionaliz-
ing instrument for the establishment of constitutional monarchy. 
13 The early modern period was crucial with respect to the revolutionary ide-
ology. In fact, for two centuries the ideologists (especially in England and France) 
developed a program for the reorganization of society. Obviously, a great variety 
of new ideas, principles, slogans, demands would emerge in the course of revolu-
tions. The migration from the countries where revolutions occurred also had 
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a great impact on the distribution of ideologies (including the conservative, coun-
terrevolutionary one). 
14 Due to the confiscation of Church lands, the dissolution of monks and nuns 
and other step. 
15 The utmost importance of the religious issue for this revolution is proved 
by the fact that 10 out of 17 southern Dutch provinces, where Catholicism pre-
vailed, did not want a total break-up with Spain and eventually remained a part of 
the Habsburg monarchy, preserving the Catholic faith. Thus, only seven Northern 
provinces, where the Calvinists predominated, founded the republic, it was the 
Dutch Republic (Republic of the United Netherlands). 
16 The Church of England reasserted its firm positions during the Restoration 
of the Stuart Dynasty, remaining predominant in England since then. 
17 Although the American Revolution (the struggle for independence) was 
secular, the role of the Puritans and other Protestants who moved to the American 
colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was very significant at 
that time. And the fact that they were fighting against the king, who headed the 
Anglican Church, inspired them even more. 
18 It is important that along with the diffusion of technologies one sometimes 
observes a direct migration of those who owns them (as it happened in England, 
where craftspeople from Flanders and from Huguenot France had moved). The 
transfer of dissident ideology is also associated with this.  
19 The Reformation was rather a war of sermons than that one of printed 
word, despite the fact that the role of the latter enormously increased. 
20 Basing on the history of the English Revolution, Joseph de Maistre (1997: 
158, 169, 187–188), one of the leading conservative analysts of the French Revo-
lution, predicted in 1796 the restoration of the royal power in France.  
21 The concept of citizenship was undoubtedly inspired by ancient, in particu-
lar, Roman stories, in this and some other respects (the idea of the consulate was 
also taken from the Roman tradition). Certainly, the French revolution was a kind 
of imitation of ancient examples. 
22 For a brief analysis of the nineteenth-century revolutions see also Grinin's 
Chapter 11 ‘Revolution and Revolutionary Movements’ in the second volume of 
the book Historical Globalistics (Zinkina et al. 2017). 
23 A revolution of the kind unexpectedly broke out in Iran in the second half 
of the twentieth century (1978−1979), which, in my opinion, was connected with 
two factors (along with historical peculiarities of the relationship between reli-
gious leaders and secular authorities in Iran): with the fact that the Middle East 
reached the typological level of European development of the sixteenth-
seventeenth centuries, and with the fact that the role of revolutions in historical 
process has decreased in the world. The Islamic revolution in Iran was a new ideo-
logical model, competing with the ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ revolutionary tradi-
tions and significant ideas (Dzhanabi 2015: 58−59). However, it is important to 
note that the first Iranian revolution (1905−1911) also had an evident religious 
color, also the clergy played a great part during its first stage (Doroshenko 1998: 
8−9). The ignorant, fanatically believing and bound by religious traditions people 
obediently followed not so much the ‘liberals’ but their spiritual leaders. And 
when the Shia clergy turned against the revolution, the obedient crowd followed 
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it. Doroshenko also cites other Iranians' views that the participation of the reli-
gious establishment in the revolutionary movement was connected with the rivalry 
with secular authorities in the fields of education, law, influence on the people; 
they were also interested in weakening of the secular power and preserving its 
influence over the state policy. The Ulemas and mullahs diverged from the revo-
lution after its ‘anti-Islamic potential’ became more obvious for them (Doroshen-
ko 1998: 13–17). According to other researchers, the revolution of 1905–1911 
was a ‘direct clash’ between two ideologies: Islam and Western modernism (Ibid.: 
18). The same refers to the 1978–1979 revolution. With the account of this fact 
the Iranian revolutions, especially taken together, appear unique phenomena and 
to a certain extent have no analogues in history (Ibid.: 8). 
24 Almost the whole range of revolutions emerged during the period of the 
European ‘Spring of Nations’ between 1848 and 1849. This is one of the reasons 
to consider this sequence of revolutions as a single great revolution due to its con-
sequences. 
25 Later there hardly occurred a revolution of this rare kind, except for the 
one in 1989 in the GDR, where the very desire to unite with Western Germany 
appeared the key factor. We may possibly regard the events in the Donbass and 
a little bit earlier – in the former Soviet space in Transnistria and South Ossetia 
(with certain reservations) in the same context. 
26 The given typology is just one of many possible typologies, which can be 
applied for various reasons. For the Russian readers the following Marxist typolo-
gy is the most familiar: the bourgeois (including bourgeois-democratic) and so-
cialist revolutions.  
27 Quite another matter is Syria and especially Libya, where the inspiration 
from abroad and direct intervention in the events were much more active. 
28 The opinions that revolutions are ‘a social malady’ which can be avoided 
and that a society can develop through some other means (reforms, in particular) 
and revolutions cost too much, etc. were widely spread already after the Great 
French Revolution. Starting form the second half of the nineteenth century it be-
came a dominant idea in social philosophy especially after the spread of Herbert 
Spencer's evolutionary ideas. In the twentieth century this almost became a postu-
late in academic social studies (e.g., Adams 1913; Sorokin 1925; Edwards 1927: 
9; Pettee 1938; Brinton 1965 [1938]; Brogan 1952: 96; Carr 1955: 710; Wolfe 
1965: 7; Berger and Neuhaus 1970: 53; Dunn 1972: 11–12; Boulding 1953: xiv; 
Ellul 1971: 39, 43). 
29 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that to seize the telegraph and te- 
lephone stations was the most important aim during the October uprising. 
30 Television could be used as a means to evoke sympathy for revolutions in 
the periphery (or vice versa). Also, the rise of terrorism was not least connected 
with the spread of television. Rather, the role of the latter was important only in 
a series of anti-communist revolutions in Europe, when opposition representatives 
had many supporters on television and actively prepared countries for changes 
employing the idea of freedom of speech and information. 
31 Here I will pay attention only to some aspects of this issue, in particular to 
the connection of the cycle of revolution with the development of its ideology.  
32 For the analysis of this ‘law’ see: Grinin, Korotayev 2014. 
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33 On 9 Thermidor, according to the French Republican Calendar (27/28 Ju-
ly) 1794 there took place a coup that ended the Jacobean dictatorship. Maximilien 
Robespierre, Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, Georges Couthon and other revolution-
aries were executed, while Joseph Fouché and Paul Barras and others, who united 
the opponents of Robespierre, came to power. 
34 Its predecessor, the collection Vekhi [Milestones] is described below. 
35 However, Trotsky himself did not claim primacy, pointing out in one of 
the anti-Stalin articles that it is not easy to determine who was the first to appeal 
to historical analogy with Thermidor. Anyway, already in 1926 a group of ‘demo-
cratic centralism’ (V. M. Smirnov, T. V. Sapronov and others executed by Stalin 
in exile) confirmed: ‘Thermidor is fait accompli!’ (Trotsky 1935). In 1938, Crane 
Brinton systematically and thoroughly described the stages of revolutions. He 
pointed out Thermidor as the last one and devoted to its examination a whole 
Chapter 8. (The other stages he defines are: the first stage ending with the victory 
of revolutions; the subsequent stages are the Rule of the Moderates; the Accession 
of the Extremists; Reigns of Terror and Virtue) (Brinton 1965 [1938]). Among 
modern scholars studing the Thermidor stage one can mention Bronislaw Baczko 
(1994), Shultz (2015); Mau and Starodubrovskaya (2001). 
36 On the correlation between ideology and practice see Nazaretyan 2016. 
37 However, both during this period and later, there may be attempts to carry 
out even more radical transformations, but they usually do not receive support or 
are defeated. With respect to the French Revolution we should mention the so-
called ‘The Enrage’ and Gracchus Babeuf’s ‘Conspiracy of Equals’ (1796), whose 
participants set a goal to equalize property. In Soviet Russia on the eve of the 
introduction of NEP there were many hotheads who wanted to march to Europe in 
order to approach the coming of the world revolution.  
38 Yet, there were some efforts in this direction, since Oliver Cromwell as-
signed his son Richard as a successor of the Lord Protector. 
39 The renewal of the mandate for ten years was enshrined by the referendum 
on December 21, 1851; the transformation of the presidency into a monarchy – by 
the referendum on November 21, 1852. The actions of Louis Bonaparte were 
approved by an overwhelming majority of votes in both referenda.  
40 The moderate revolutionary demands represent a certain prerequisite for 
a successful revolution (in the sense that society overcomes a moderate revolution 
rather easily and quickly returns to normal life as well as gets a rather strong im-
pulse for development). The increasing social demands in case of the success of 
a revolution bring drastic and costly societal transformations with temporary shift 
away from the general historical mainstream. At the same time, it is important that 
a slower but more peaceful development finally turns out to be more successful, 
that is to say, slow and steady wins the race.  
41 In particular, Thorstein Veblen argued that sometimes a leisure class may 
lose the instinct for self-preservation. For example, that was the case with the 
Romans during the barbarian invasions in the late Roman Empire. Yet, in a book 
analyzing sociological theories the authors tried to correct Veblen arguing that the 
leisure class loses not the sense for self-preservation but the skill to self-defense, 
that is, that the Romans probably forgot how to protect themselves, that is forgot 
how to do it since the barbarians had replaced them everywhere (Adams, Sydie 
2002: 253). Sometimes, we observe a real helplessness as showed, for example, 
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by the European administrators facing the invasion of migrants in 2015. In Rus-
sia's best-known fabulist Ivan Krylov's words, they failed to ‘use the power’. This 
can be observed when not autochthons, but the newcomers work in the most im-
portant positions, for example, in manufacturing. Samuel Huntington (1968) also 
notes that on the eve of revolution the former elite ‘loses will to power and the 
ability to rule’. But there are situations when the elite loses just the instinct for 
self-preservation. This can be also exacerbated by the desire to imitate the more 
developed societies via establishing institutions that do not correspond to the 
elite’s interests and to which society is not ready. The establishment of democratic 
institutions after which the elite may lose its power, is quite frequent. As far as 
I remember, this happened under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 
USSR, though there was no need for such an abrupt turn to democracy. 
42 It is characteristic that the king still ordered the Life Guards to disperse the 
disobedient deputies, but when the guards tried to enter the hall of minor pleasures 
where they gathered, Marquis de La Fayette and some remaining noblemen 
blocked their route with swords in their hands. 
43 For an interesting analysis of this miscellany see Eidelman n.d. 
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